http://dspace.cityu.edu.hk:80/handle/2031/701 2013-05-06T16:45:40Z 2013-05-06T16:45:40Z Wang, Ran ( 王然) http://dspace.cityu.edu.hk:80/handle/2031/6469 2012-08-07T07:41:58Z 2011-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: Voluntary disclosure in IPO prospectus in China : the effect of underwriter reputation and ownership structure Authors: Wang, Ran ( 王然) Abstract: This dissertation examines voluntary disclosure behavior in the China A-share initial public offering (IPO) market. It analyzes how underwriter reputation and ownership structure influence the extent of voluntary disclosure in IPO prospectus. Based on the data of 375 Chinese IPO firms from 2004 to 2008, the empirical findings show an interesting phenomenon: hiring underwriters of China Securities Regulatory Commission’s (CSRC) highly rated securities companies is negatively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure in IPO prospectus, but hiring foreign-shared securities companies as underwriters is positively linked to higher levels of the voluntary disclosure level in the IPO prospectus. The findings also show a significantly negative relation between state-owned enterprises (SOE) and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the IPO prospectus. This study is among the first to investigate the incentives, such as underwriter reputation and ownership structure, on the supply level of voluntary disclosure in the IPO prospectus in China. Examination of CSRC rating of securities underwriters against Sino-foreign joint venture underwriters on voluntary disclosure in the IPO prospectus contributes to a better understanding of how government intervention distorts the information environment of the IPO market. It also helps to understand the SOE voluntary disclosure behavior in the IPO process when the government is both the ruler and a player in the market. This study is valuable for both domestic and global investors who would like to gain more knowledge of the Chinese IPO market. Notes: CityU Call Number: HG4028.S7 W36 2011; ii, 76 leaves 30 cm.; Thesis (M.Phil.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2011.; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 62-66)

2011-01-01T00:00:00Z Mak, Kelvin Po-lung (麥寶龍) http://dspace.cityu.edu.hk:80/handle/2031/6102 2011-05-25T01:13:44Z 2010-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: Financial analysts' actions and cost of equity capital Authors: Mak, Kelvin Po-lung (麥寶龍) Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between financial analysts' actions and cost of equity capital. In this study, financial analysts' actions include analysts' forecasts dispersion, analysts' forecast revision frequencies and analysts' responsiveness to quarterly earnings announcements. There are empirical studies that attempt to find out the variables that are associated with firm’s cost of equity capital. One research study finds that poorer accruals quality is associated with larger costs of capital. However, a more recent empirical study shows no evidence that accruals quality and costs of equity capital are associated. As such, the link between accounting accruals quality and cost of equity capital has not been conclusively established under empirical tests. Instead of looking at firm specific accounting information that managers of firms want to signal to market participants, i.e., accounting accruals quality, this study attempts to find out the relationship between financial analysts' actions, which is exogenous to firms, and cost of equity capital. The empirical results of my study show that firms with larger analysts’ forecasts dispersion, their cost of equity capital is higher. Nevertheless, this relationship is substituted by analysts' responsiveness to quarterly earnings announcements, after controlling for accounting accruals quality, idiosyncratic and systematic risk. Keywords: Accruals quality; Analysts' responsiveness; Analysts' forecasts dispersion; Analysts' forecast revision frequencies; Idiosyncratic risk; Systematic risk; Cost of equity capital Notes: CityU Call Number: HG4661 .M34 2010; ii, 128 leaves 30 cm.; Thesis (Ph.D.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2010.; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 122-128)

2010-01-01T00:00:00Z Hu, Fang (胡方) http://dspace.cityu.edu.hk:80/handle/2031/5751 2010-03-19T05:18:18Z 2009-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: Top management turnover, firm performance and corporate governance in political economy : evidence from China's listed state-owned enterprises Authors: Hu, Fang (胡方) Abstract: This dissertation investigates the corporate control mechanism and usefulness of accounting information for control mechanism in the political economy by examining the linkage of management turnover, firm performance and corporate governance in China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The first essay investigates the relationship between top management turnover, firm performance, and government control interests in China’s listed SOEs. Firstly, this study evidences an inverse relationship between top management turnover and various accounting measures of firm performance in China’s SOEs. This finding implies that an effective method of corporate control, based on accounting information, exists in China’s SOE. This effective performance-based turnover is induced by government interests for economic performance rather than external market pressure in market economy argued by prior studies. Secondly, this study investigates how government control interests influence turnover-performance relationship by examining SOE characteristics such as the concentration or jurisdictional level of government ownership, the market power or in a strategic industry. The results suggest that government control interests or involvement have important implications on the method of corporate control and that a highly involved government owner may enhance a tight corporate control. The second essay studies the corporate control mechanism designed by the government in a political economy by investigating the replacement and appointment of management in China’s state-owned enterprises. Firstly, this study finds that the state owner is more likely to remove incumbent top executives and appoint a politically-connected executive when a SOE encounters economic distress such as poor ROA, earnings loss, high financial risk, or political distress such as regulation violation. Further, it examines the likelihood of appointing a politically-connected executive in a poor-performing SOE with characteristics such as the concentration or jurisdictional level of government ownership, the market power or in a strategic industry. Finally, this study finds that the political top executives improve firm performance following their appointments, initiating modification of internal governance structures and mitigating manager’s discretion behavior. All these findings support the arguments that state owner (government) considers political executives helpful to improve firm performance and control agency problems. Meanwhile, the post-appointment consequences suggest that political executives serve as a disciplinary or monitoring mechanism substituting for external market control, instead of being only a form of bail-out. The findings in this dissertation contribute to the literature by examining corporate control mechanism and the usefulness of accounting information in a distinguished context and provide more understanding of the value of political institutions. Notes: CityU Call Number: HD4318 .H784 2009; iv, 124 leaves : ill. 30 cm.; Thesis (Ph.D.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2009.; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 75-85)

2009-01-01T00:00:00Z Yang, Sixian http://dspace.cityu.edu.hk:80/handle/2031/5742 2010-03-19T05:08:31Z 2008-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: Management ownership and earnings management : an empirical test Authors: Yang, Sixian Abstract: This paper tests the influence of management ownership on earnings management using U.S. data. Different from event-driven and short-term incentives, management ownership may have a persistent influence on the accounting discretion of managers and long-term impact on agency problems. Through exploring both the alignment effect and the entrenchment effect of management ownership concurrently, examining interactions of management ownership with other monitoring mechanisms, and circumstances that might affect those interactions, I find that higher management ownership reduces the magnitude of abnormal accruals when management ownership is at a low level; higher management ownership increases the magnitude of abnormal accruals when management ownership reaches a high level, with a possibility that it may further get reduced when management ownership reaches a much higher level. The negative association between abnormal accruals and management ownership is stronger in upward earnings management than in downward earnings management; however the negative association between abnormal accruals and management ownership is more significantly strengthened by monitoring mechanisms, including analyst following and block shareholding. Notes: CityU Call Number: HG4028.P7 Y36 2008; 39 leaves 30 cm.; Thesis (M.Phil.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2008.; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 24-26)

2008-01-01T00:00:00Z