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    <pubDate>Sat, 01 Jun 2013 06:33:02 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2013-06-01T06:33:02Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Voluntary disclosure in IPO prospectus in China : the effect of underwriter reputation and ownership structure</title>
      <link>http://dspace.cityu.edu.hk:80/handle/2031/6469</link>
      <description>Title: Voluntary disclosure in IPO prospectus in China : the effect of underwriter reputation and ownership structure
Authors: Wang, Ran ( 王然)
Abstract: ﻿This dissertation examines voluntary disclosure behavior in the China A-share initial 
public offering (IPO) market. It analyzes how underwriter reputation and ownership 
structure influence the extent of voluntary disclosure in IPO prospectus. Based on the 
data of 375 Chinese IPO firms from 2004 to 2008, the empirical findings show an 
interesting phenomenon: hiring underwriters of China Securities Regulatory 
Commission’s (CSRC) highly rated securities companies is negatively related to the 
extent of voluntary disclosure in IPO prospectus, but hiring foreign-shared securities 
companies as underwriters is positively linked to higher levels of the voluntary disclosure 
level in the IPO prospectus. The findings also show a significantly negative relation 
between state-owned enterprises (SOE) and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the IPO 
prospectus. This study is among the first to investigate the incentives, such as underwriter 
reputation and ownership structure, on the supply level of voluntary disclosure in the IPO 
prospectus in China. Examination of CSRC rating of securities underwriters against 
Sino-foreign joint venture underwriters on voluntary disclosure in the IPO prospectus 
contributes to a better understanding of how government intervention distorts the 
information environment of the IPO market. It also helps to understand the SOE voluntary disclosure behavior in the IPO process when the government is both the ruler 
and a player in the market. This study is valuable for both domestic and global investors 
who would like to gain more knowledge of the Chinese IPO market.
Notes: CityU Call Number: HG4028.S7 W36 2011; ii, 76 leaves   30 cm.; Thesis (M.Phil.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2011.; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 62-66)</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 01 Jan 2011 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2011-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Management ownership and earnings management : an empirical test</title>
      <link>http://dspace.cityu.edu.hk:80/handle/2031/5742</link>
      <description>Title: Management ownership and earnings management : an empirical test
Authors: Yang, Sixian
Abstract: ﻿This paper tests the influence of management ownership on earnings management using U.S. data. Different from event-driven and short-term incentives, management ownership may have a persistent influence on the accounting discretion of managers and long-term impact on agency problems. Through exploring both the alignment effect and the entrenchment effect of management ownership concurrently, examining interactions of management ownership with other monitoring mechanisms, and circumstances that might affect those interactions, I find that higher management ownership reduces the magnitude of abnormal accruals when management ownership is at a low level; higher management ownership increases the magnitude of abnormal accruals when management ownership reaches a high level, with a possibility that it may further get reduced when management ownership reaches a much higher level. The negative association between abnormal accruals and management ownership is stronger in upward earnings management than in downward earnings management; however the negative association between abnormal accruals and management ownership is more significantly strengthened by monitoring mechanisms, including analyst following and block shareholding.
Notes: CityU Call Number: HG4028.P7 Y36 2008; 39 leaves   30 cm.; Thesis (M.Phil.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2008.; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 24-26)</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://dspace.cityu.edu.hk:80/handle/2031/5742</guid>
      <dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Earnings quality, information quality and investor protection : evidence from Chinese non-tradable shares reform</title>
      <link>http://dspace.cityu.edu.hk:80/handle/2031/4880</link>
      <description>Title: Earnings quality, information quality and investor protection : evidence from Chinese non-tradable shares reform
Authors: She, Zhongqiang (佘中強)
Abstract: This dissertation examines the roles of earnings quality and information quality with regard to capital reform of the Chinese stock market. This is the first study of its kind to show that lower information quality and poor earnings quality will result in a higher “total compensation amount” to holders of tradable shares when switching non-tradable capital stock into tradable shares. The total compensation amount is the amount that holders of tradable shares receive in compensation for their losses due to the conversion of non-tradable shares into tradable shares. Earnings quality was measured by accruals quality to test hypotheses about the relationships between earnings quality, information quality and the total compensation amount. The regression results of 1,290 Chinese listed-companies which are involved in the capital reform confirm that lower earnings quality leads to higher compensation to holders of tradable shares and that the total compensation amount increases as information quality decreases.  Key Words:  Earnings Quality, Information Quality, Investor Protection, “Non-tradable Shares Reform”, Compensation, Chinese Stock Market
Notes: CityU Call Number: HG5782.S5135 2007; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 74-84); Thesis (M.Phil.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2007; iii, 84 leaves ; 30 cm.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2007 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://dspace.cityu.edu.hk:80/handle/2031/4880</guid>
      <dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Auditor rotation versus audit partner rotation : an examination of audit quality, audit pricing and audit report lag in Australia</title>
      <link>http://dspace.cityu.edu.hk:80/handle/2031/4254</link>
      <description>Title: Auditor rotation versus audit partner rotation : an examination of audit quality, audit pricing and audit report lag in Australia
Authors: Cheuk, Man Chiu (卓文超)
Abstract: This study investigates the effect of audit partner and audit firm rotation on audit quality, audit pricing and audit report timeliness which are measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals, audit fees and number of days between year ends and audit report dates respectively in a voluntary regime. Using data from Australian audit market where each audit report discloses the name of the only audit engagement partner, I first replicate and modify tests in prior studies and find that the generally observed positive association between audit firm tenure and audit quality disappears when there is audit partner rotation. Then, I introduce two dummies for audit partner and firm rotation in the regressions. My results show the following. (1) There are no significant differences in audit quality between engagements with audit partner rotation and those with audit firm rotation. (2) Audit quality of engagements with audit partner rotation is also not significantly different from that without any rotation. (3) Audit fees of engagements with audit partner rotation are significantly different from those with audit firm rotation only if the confounding effect of low-balling practice is not controlled for. (4) Audit engagements with audit partner rotation are charged significantly higher audit fees than ongoing engagements. On the other hand, the results of audit timeliness show that, contrary to the start-up time hypothesis, audit partner rotation and lateral audit firm rotation do not affect audit report lags (ARL) significantly. Nor does cross-down audit firm rotation have any significant effect. Nevertheless, a positive and significant association between cross-up audit firm rotation and ARL is observed. Thus, the realignment hypothesis seems to play a more influential role in ARL determination comparing with the start-up time and auditor-timeliness difference hypotheses. Taken collectively, the empirical tests provide evidence that does not support audit partner and audit firm rotation policies that are being espoused by regulators around the world to boost up audit quality.
Notes: CityU Call Number: HF5616.A8 C45 2006; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 65-73); Thesis (M.Phil.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2006; ii, 99 leaves ; 30 cm.</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2006 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://dspace.cityu.edu.hk:80/handle/2031/4254</guid>
      <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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