The relationship between economic growth and corruption in reforming China: a new institutionalist analysis of civil servants' in the 1990s

Abstract

This study attempts to examine the relationship between rapid economic growth and corruption in China. Throughout the era of reform in the 1980s, it is evident that the problem of corruption has grown radically. Nonetheless, a decline in corruption is found in many Eastern European countries at the time of economic boom. This is a question that needs attention if we want to further understand the origin of corruption in China. New Institutionalism adopted by this study emphasizes on the reciprocal relationship between institutions and agents. This paper then attempts to examine the changing relationship between institutional changes and agent choices. It is evident that the disclosure of corruption is heavily correlated to fluctuating central determination. In the first half of the 1990s, this tendency is particularly obvious. For instance, right after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and the succession of Jiang Zemin, the statistics of corruption has shown a great correlation. Nonetheless, in the second half of the 1990s, the story has changed, as legal constraints were reinforced, corruption has shown a steady decline in terms of its case number. Based on the research findings, the author attempts to argue that corruption is largely a result of weak legal constraints. Corruption can only be cracked down by tracking its origin.