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|Title: ||Symmetric incentive compatible auctions, inter-temporal auctions and coordination among multiple auctions|
|Other Titles: ||Dui cheng ji li xiang rong pai mai, fen shi pai mai he pai mai de xie zuo|
|Authors: ||Sun, Wei (孫為)|
|Department: ||Department of Computer Science|
|Degree: ||Master of Philosophy|
|Issue Date: ||2008|
|Publisher: ||City University of Hong Kong|
|Subjects: ||Internet auctions.|
|Notes: ||viii, 83 leaves 30 cm.|
Thesis (M.Phil.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2008.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 74-81)
CityU Call Number: HF5478 .S86 2008
|Abstract: ||This thesis studies three topics on incentive compatible auction protocols.
The market models for these three protocols are different to each other.
The first topic, symmetric incentive compatible auctions, considers the
auction market as being consisted of one seller supplying multiple identical
items and multiple buyers each demanding a single item.
The second topic, multi-unit auction with inter-temporal elastic supply, is
concerned with allocating multiple units of identical items to n bidders over
m periods. In each period the supply is limited and perishable such that a
unit produced at one time period can only be consumed within that period.
Each buyer demands a certain number of units across all time periods.
The third topic, coordination mechanism among multiple auctions, mod-
els the market as monopolistic competitive where there are m sellers and n
buyers. Each seller has a limit of supply of units of identical items. The
items provided by different sellers are substitute but may not be identical to
each other. Each buyer demands exactly one item from any of the sellers.
The major effort in the first topic is focused on the analysis of the basic
properties of symmetric incentive compatible auctions. The major efforts in
the second and third topics are focused on the design of efficient algorithms
that guarantee truthful input and social efficiency maximizing output.|
|Online Catalog Link: ||http://lib.cityu.edu.hk/record=b2268779|
|Appears in Collections:||CS - Master of Philosophy |
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