CityU Institutional Repository >
3_CityU Electronic Theses and Dissertations >
ETD - Dept. of Manufacturing Engineering and Engineering Management >
MEEM - Master of Philosophy >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title: ||Designing efficient mechanisms for mergers & acquisitions and studying impacts of such events on stock prices|
|Other Titles: ||Wei qi ye bing gou she ji you xiao ji zhi bing yan jiu ci lei shi jian dui gong si gu jia de ying xiang|
|Authors: ||Zhong, Guixian (鍾貴賢)|
|Department: ||Department of Manufacturing Engineering and Engineering Management|
|Degree: ||Master of Philosophy|
|Issue Date: ||2010|
|Publisher: ||City University of Hong Kong|
|Subjects: ||Consolidation and merger of corporations.|
Stocks -- Prices.
|Notes: ||CityU Call Number: HD2746.5 .Z45 2010|
xi, 94 leaves 30 cm.
Thesis (M.Phil.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2010.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 68-75)
|Abstract: ||Mechanism Design studies solution concepts for a class of private information
games. Such class of games is usually solved by a mechanism which motivates each
agent to disclose their true information while at the same time punishes the liar.
Economic transactions take place in markets, within firms and under a host of
other institutional arrangements. Some markets are free of government intervention
while some are under controlled by government. Mechanism design theory provides
a coherent framework for analyzing this great variety of institutions, or "allocation
mechanisms", with a focus on the problems associated with incentives and private
My work focuses on modeling a particular economic game situation - the
negotiation of Merger and Acquisition among firms, and then applying mechanism
design theory on it so as to achieve a particular economic goal - maximizing Social Surplus. Several important propositions were obtained, and we choose to test
these propositions in Information-based Industries by Event Study Methodology.
Supportive empirical results were also obtained. Therefore, we conclude that Mechanism Design is a workable approach to Merger and Acquisition problems. More
researches on this topic are deserved.|
|Online Catalog Link: ||http://lib.cityu.edu.hk/record=b3947906|
|Appears in Collections:||MEEM - Master of Philosophy |
Items in CityU IR are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.